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the struggle for Gender equality in 
the northern District of ohio
tracy A. thomas
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, like many of its sister courts, was reluctantly drawn into the national debate over sex 
equality 1970s. The court’s response mirrored the greater social response, ini-
tially showing a hostility to claims of gender discrimination that was slowly dis-
placed by recognition and endorsement of sex equality rights. Three of the 
district’s cases on women’s rights that went to the U.S. Supreme Court, dis-
cussed in this chapter, helped navigate this shift toward gender equality.
 The Northern District was goaded into action by the newly formed Wom-
en’s Law Fund (WLF), one of the first nonprofit litigation organizations in the 
nation to bring sex discrimination claims. The WLF was led by Jane Picker, one 
of the first female law professors at Cleveland State University, and counseled 
by board member Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then head of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project and later a U.S. Supreme Court 
justice. These leaders instigated the reforms needed through the judicial pro-
cess, believing, like many social justice groups, that the courts were the best 
vehicles to bring about change. In 1971, the Fund’s first case, LaFleur v. Cleve-
land Board of Education, challenged mandatory maternity leaves for pregnant 
teachers.1 As this chapter will show, the lawyers encountered an incredulous 
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court and resistance from the community as they took on deeply embedded 
notions of the proper role of women in the workplace and family.
 The community backlash continued as advocates sought to protect a wom-
an’s right to bodily autonomy and abortion. In 1973, the Supreme Court legal-
ized abortion in Roe v. Wade.2 The Roe Court recognized a fundamental privacy 
right to choose abortion, free from governmental interference in the first tri-
mester, but new regulations continued to circumscribe abortion. Two major 
abortion regulation cases came before the Northern District on their way to the 
Supreme Court: Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron and 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen.3 The Northern District wrestled 
with the legality of highly detailed regulations designed to discourage abortion, 
first upholding them in part but later invalidating the laws. The Supreme Court 
overruled the lower courts in both cases. Although the district courts had care-
fully tried to fit the cases within constitutional parameters, they had not pre-
dicted the Supreme Court’s changing standards.
 These three cases from Ohio together offer a snapshot of the larger soci-
etal change for women’s rights. The nascent women’s movement in the courts 
proceeded initially along dual fronts of employment and abortion. The North-
ern District cases show the tensions and commonalities between these ap-
proaches and exemplify the development of broad-scale gender litigation across 
the nation.
A Reluctant Agent of Change
In April 1971, the Northern District of Ohio was confronted with one of its earliest 
cases of sex discrimination. In LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, Jo Carol 
LaFleur, a junior high teacher at an all-black inner-city school in Cleveland, 
challenged the board’s policy of requiring unpaid maternity leave for all mar-
ried female teachers who were more than four months pregnant. The rule also 
prohibited a teacher from returning to her job prior to the first school term after 
her child was three months old, and it did not guarantee her a position, but only 
a priority for any vacancy. These maternity policies were part of the long history 
of discrimination by schools against women, which forced married and then 
pregnant women to resign their jobs.4
 The Cleveland maternity leave policy enacted in 1952 was passed because 
male administrators thought that it was inappropriate for schoolchildren to see 
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a pregnant woman and confront the obvious implications of sexuality. As testi-
mony would show, the policy was motivated by school officials’ desire to save a 
noticeably pregnant woman from embarrassment in the form of giggling school-
children and their comments such as “my teacher swallowed a watermelon,” 
and to protect students from the sight of a conspicuously pregnant woman.5 But 
the board rationalized its policy during the LaFleur litigation as being impor-
tant to protecting the health of the woman and baby and to providing continuity 
of instruction for the children. The school superintendent who drafted the origi-
nal regulation believed that women should stay home with their children after 
giving birth: “I am a strong believer that young children ought to have the mother 
there to take tender care of the babies.” Many of America’s problems, he sug-
gested, stemmed from working mothers who neglected their infants.6
 LaFleur thought the policy was “archaic and silly” and refused to quit her 
job. She believed that since her baby was due in July, leaving at the end of the 
semester better served continuity of instruction rather than leaving abruptly in 
mid-March as the principal insisted. (LaFleur had refused to tell the principal 
her due date, so he was guessing as to the four-month point.) Furthermore, stu-
dents who were pregnant were allowed to attend school throughout their preg-
nancies, and LaFleur taught some of these pregnant students in a transition 
class for girls who were at risk for dropping out of school. The idealistic LaFleur 
had wanted to teach these students out of her emerging sense of social justice, 
utilizing the specialized training she received in “ghetto teaching” in a master 
of teaching program she completed at John Carroll University. She thought that 
she could serve as a good role model for her students, being a married woman 
who was taking care of herself and her baby during pregnancy. The principal 
disagreed, and tempers flared as he forced LaFleur out by completing the leave 
forms for her.7
 If was difficult for LaFleur to find a lawyer to take her case. She filed a griev-
ance with the teacher’s union, but the union representative told her to “just go 
home and have your baby.” She tried the Cleveland branch of the ACLU, but 
it turned down her case, saying it was “a loser.” The organization was instead 
focusing its litigation efforts on cases for male students challenging school bans 
on beards as a denial of fundamental rights.8 Desperate, LaFleur called the li-
brary at the Cleveland Plain Dealer looking for the name of a “women’s lib” 
group. The newspaper librarian gave her several numbers, including that for 
the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), through which she reached vol-
unteer attorney Jane Picker.9
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 WEAL was founded in Cleveland in 1968 and later headquartered in Wash-
ington, D.C., until it disbanded in 1989. It was formed as a small spin-off from 
the National Organization of Women (NOW) by more conservative feminists 
wishing to avoid issues of abortion and sexuality. Its founder, Dr. Elizabeth Boyer, 
explained: “There’s a great difference between the women’s liberation movement 
and the women’s rights movement which WEAL represents.”10 WEAL believed 
that the abortion issue would discredit the emerging feminist movement and 
“feminist respectability.” Instead, the group focused its agenda on the advance-
ment of opportunities for women in education and employment, including mon-
itoring implementation and enforcement of Title IX of the 1972 Education Act 
Amendments regarding equal opportunity for women in education and sports.11
 Picker became a WEAL volunteer attorney when she moved to Cleveland 
in the fall of 1970. A Yale Law School graduate, she relocated to Cleveland 
when her husband, Sidney, was hired as a visiting professor at Case Western 
Reserve School of Law. When Sidney was offered a permanent position in De-
cember 1970, Picker began to look for a job but found it extraordinarily difficult 
to find a firm willing to hire a woman. Such resistance led her to conclude that 
Cleveland was “the most conservative city” she had ever seen. She had been 
raised in the East, lived abroad in Bangkok and Australia, and worked in Wash-
ington, D.C., and never before had she been aware of being discriminated 
against as a woman as she was in Cleveland. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey even-
tually hired her as the firm’s first female lawyer to work as an attorney. (Two 
other female lawyers worked at the firm, one as a law librarian and one as a 
secretary.) However, the firm denied her the opportunity to litigate cases as she 
desired and instead relegated her to “public law” and backroom research. When 
the call came from LaFleur in early 1971, Picker was conflicted out of the case 
because the firm and her partner Charles Clarke represented the defendant, 
the Cleveland School Board.
 Another WEAL volunteer, Carol Agin, tried the case. But Picker handled 
all of the research and wrote the briefs. It was her idea to plead the case under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a federal claim for constitutional violations of civil rights. 
Picker had been sent to the Cleveland law library on an assignment from the 
firm. While there, she began flipping through the federal employment report-
ers and read the many cases of successful race discrimination litigation under 
section 1983. She thought that the same approach should work for sex, and she 
used the general contours of the Fourteenth Amendment to frame the legal is-
sues in LaFleur.12
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 The case was assigned to Judge James Connell, a crusty and conservative 
seventy-three-year-old former prosecutor who “was very unfriendly to the case.” 
He was “very old school” and “believed a woman’s place was in the home, and 
therefore, certainly, a pregnant woman’s place was in the home.” Judge Connell 
called a pretrial hearing immediately after the papers in the case were filed, just 
weeks after LaFleur was forced out of her job. He greeted the counsel for the 
school board, Charles Clarke, in a welcoming and gentlemanly manner. He 
then turned to Carol Agin and said, “Young woman, why do you waste the fed-
eral court’s time with such frivolous matters?” Concerned that the court’s appar-
ent bias would prejudice the plaintiff, Picker asked her neighbor, Case Western 
law professor Lewis Katz, to serve as co-counsel in the case. As Katz explained, 
“You have to understand. Women were treated very shabbily in and by the pro-
fession at that time, and for some years after.”13 Indeed, it would be twenty years 
before judicial task forces on gender fairness would denounce this type of gen-
der bias in the courts.14
 The two-day hearing in the LaFleur case was, according to Katz, “extremely 
unpleasant.” Judge Connell clearly thought this case was ridiculous, and he di-
rected his wrath toward the plaintiffs, sustaining objections that had not been 
made and rephrasing many of attorney Agin’s questions. Meanwhile, a second 
plaintiff had joined the case—Ann Nelson, the wife of one of Katz’s law students. 
The student had come to Katz at midsemester in need of a scholarship when his 
pregnant wife lost her job as a Cleveland junior high school teacher. Teachers 
in their first year of teaching, as Ann Nelson was, were terminated if they be-
came pregnant, rather than given leave and the opportunity to return.
 Plaintiffs’ counsel worked to debunk the proffered medical evidence that 
there was a risk to the woman and baby if the mother worked during pregnancy. 
Their own medical expert, Sarah Marcus, was a feisty, eighty-year-old obstetri-
cian who mocked the school district’s assumptions about women’s frailty. She 
noted that most women engaged in strenuous work at home: “There is nothing 
that the teacher does as a teacher that is any more strenuous than what a preg-
nant mother does with housework; and her attentions to the other children, if 
she has any, are also strenuous.”15 Katz tried to cross-examine the defense’s medi-
cal expert despite the judge’s interruptions—Judge Connell believed he had a 
good understanding of the medical science, having grown up as the son of an 
Akron obstetrician—and Katz did get the defense expert to admit that work did 
not negatively impact a woman’s pregnancy, a point that would be central on 
appeal. Defense counsel focused on the disabilities of the pregnant woman. 
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He asked LaFleur whether this was her first baby, to which the seven-month-
pregnant woman responded, “Yes.” Later, she realized that she would have 
answered differently had he asked her if this was her first pregnancy; she had 
been pregnant before but miscarried early while she was teaching first grade. 
That answer might have fueled the misconception that teaching was harmful to 
the baby.16
 At the end of the trial, plaintiffs asked for an injunction to stay the board’s 
decisions. Judge Connell coldly responded, “You’ll get what you deserve and 
you don’t deserve an injunction.”17 The court denied their request for prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctive relief, finding the school board policy to be 
reasonable and constitutionally permissible. Judge Connell determined that 
the mandatory maternity regulation was reasonable primarily because it mini-
mized classroom distractions and disruptions when the “teachers suffered many 
indignities as a result of pregnancy which consisted of children pointing, gig-
gling, laughing and making snide remarks causing interruption and interference 
with the classroom program of study.” He also found that the problem of the 
teacher’s health and safety was a valid concern for the school board in that “in 
an environment where the possibility of violence and accident exists, pregnancy 
greatly magnifies the probability of serious injury.”18 The plaintiffs urged the 
court to apply a more rigorous level of judicial scrutiny due to the fundamental 
nature of the interests involved. The district court, however, relied on the 1908 
Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which upheld a maximum hours law 
to protect women. Judge Connell quoted: “The two sexes differ in structure of 
body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical 
strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done stand-
ing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the 
self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to main-
tain the struggle for subsistence.”19
 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge 
Connell’s decision, finding the maternity rule arbitrary and unreasonable in its 
overbreadth. In a 2-to-1 decision, the majority found that the school board’s 
justifications were not reasonable and barely credible: “Basic rights such as 
those involved in the employment relationship cannot be made to yield to em-
barrassment.” In rejecting the mandatory leave rule, the Sixth Circuit relied on 
Reed v. Reed, decided after the LaFleur trial court decision, in which the Su-
preme Court held for the first time that sex was a classification deserving of 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.20
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 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the LaFleur case, Jane Picker 
took over as lead counsel. By then she had left her law firm and was one of three 
tenure-track female law professors at Cleveland State University. Picker created 
the Women’s Law Fund in 1972 to finance precedent-setting litigation for wom-
en’s rights.21 Like other litigation advocacy groups of the times modeled after 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its suc-
cess in the school desegregation cases, the WLF existed to fund rights litigation 
and bring about meaningful social change through the courts. Law professor 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg served on the board of the WLF, and Picker reciprocated, 
serving on Ginsburg’s board at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, also orga-
nized in 1972. Ginsburg had taken pro bono referrals for the New Jersey ACLU 
since the late 1960s, cases that were referred to her, she said, because “sex dis-
crimination cases were regarded as a woman’s job.” She accepted the cases be-
cause of her impression that the ACLU nationally and locally was not enthusiastic 
about taking on women’s rights cases and that women were not adequately rep-
resented on the organization’s governing board. The ACLU first focused its 
efforts on sex discrimination in the fall of 1971 when it declared women’s 
rights an issue of great urgency and asked all affiliates to give it high priority 
in funding and litigation.22 Feminist litigation began to take on a national 
agenda as attorneys in the sex discrimination cases shared information and co-
ordinated efforts. As Justice Ginsburg reflected, “Progress does not occur auto-
matically, but requires a concerted effort to change habitual modes of thinking 
and action.”23 Picker agreed: “It was no simple evolution. We made the change 
that happened.”24
 The WLF was initially funded by generous grants from the Ford Founda-
tion. Spurred by tenacious female staff members, Ford was the earliest philan-
thropy to commit to the women’s movement.25 The foundation’s first feminist 
pilot project was the LaFleur case. Ford began negotiations for a litigation grant 
with Jane Picker as a representative of WEAL. When Picker’s WEAL colleagues 
objected to litigating a case dealing with pregnancy discrimination, she left the 
organization, taking with her Ford’s money for a two-year start-up grant for the 
WLF. But in 1984, Ford’s WLF funding ended: in the 1980s, a change in leader-
ship at Ford shifted its emphasis to issues affecting women of color and poor and 
working-class women.26 Picker turned elsewhere for financial support, moving 
her organization to the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where she estab-
lished a sex discrimination clinic staffed by students and funded primarily by 
attorney fee awards.27
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 The LaFleur case was the WLF’s first and perhaps biggest case. Picker ar-
gued the case before the U.S. Supreme Court in January 1974 in what was her 
first argument of any kind before a court. Amicus briefs flowed in on both sides. 
Delta Air Lines, which fired pregnant stewardesses, supported the school board. 
The Nixon administration, in the heat of the Watergate cover-up, sided with 
the teachers. Picker’s sense was that the Court was not taking this case seriously. 
Just before the argument, she saw the justices passing around a journal article 
called “Love’s Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves,” and she 
watched them chuckle like schoolboys.28 She began her argument more angry 
than nervous. The first question from Justice Harry Blackmun asked her whether 
she really saw any difference between a man losing his job because he refused 
to shave his beard and a woman losing her job because she was pregnant. The 
tall and imposing Picker put her hands on her hips and said that such distinc-
tions were “getting into ludicrous questions” and that analogies between the 
beard cases and the pregnancy cases were “indeed ludicrous.”29
 The Supreme Court ruled for the women but rejected the equality analysis 
urged by Picker and the appellate court. Instead, the Court grounded its deci-
sion in due process privacy rights, harkening back to Roe v. Wade and the right 
to choose an abortion, decided just one year before. “This Court has long rec-
ognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life 
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. By acting to penal-
ize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity 
leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these pro-
tected freedoms.” The opinion by Justice Potter Stewart emphasized the proce-
dural aspects of due process in its concern over the school board’s irrebuttable 
presumption that pregnant women were unable to continue working later in 
their pregnancies, rather than using a more individualized determination. The 
Court also rejected the board’s purported reasons of continuity of instruction 
and maternal health, noting that the policy was originally inspired by “other, 
less weighty considerations” and the “outmoded taboos” of saving pregnant 
teachers from the embarrassment of giggling students and insulating children 
from the sight of a conspicuously pregnant woman.30
 The Court’s decision to abandon the equal protection claim and all of its 
promise for women’s rights infuriated Picker.31 Counsel for the school board 
had urged this approach, cautioning the Court in his rebuttal that the question 
of equal protection was “one of the most evasive issues that this Court has to de-
termine” and that “with all due respect to my sisters at the bar, [it] does go 
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somewhat beyond the narrow issue in this case.”32 The case as litigated, how-
ever, clearly presented the issue of equal protection, even if the Court was un-
willing to go there. Justice Blackmun’s conference papers and memorandum 
on LaFleur acknowledged that equal protection would have provided an “eas-
ier” and “cleaner” basis for the decision but indicated that none of the justices, 
except perhaps Justice Thurgood Marshall, thought pregnancy distinctions con-
stituted discrimination on the basis of sex.33 Conceptualized as due process, the 
case held little precedential power for the women’s movement. Picker had hoped 
for an equal protection decision early in the women’s rights litigation that would 
have accomplished the purposes of the then pending equal rights amendment 
(ERA), which Picker believed was redundant with the equality guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.34 The due process decision narrowed the issue to 
procedural technicalities of irrebuttable presumptions and was useless in fighting 
other sex discrimination battles. As Jo Carol LaFleur later recounted, her case 
was a leading opinion in the constitutional law textbooks her class used when 
she was a law student in 1975—textbooks that her fellow students asked her to 
autograph—but it soon became just a footnote.35
 Soon after LaFleur, the Court began to address sex discrimination claims 
under equal protection. Congress amended Title VII of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act to apply to public schools, and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission adopted a guideline that prohibited special maternity 
leave rules as sex discrimination. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act defining pregnancy discrimination as “sex” discrimination.36 
But LaFleur was still a milestone in the legal status of women in the workplace 
and had the tangible effect of quickly invalidating the many mandatory mater-
nity leave policies nationwide that had predominated since the 1950s. As LaFleur 
later reflected, “Sometimes it takes a trial lawyer to vindicate a person’s rights; 
and . . . every now and then advocacy for one client ripples throughout the na-
tion and aids thousands of persons, altering the cultural contours and drowning 
ugly stereotypes.”37
 In the end, LaFleur and Nelson were awarded back pay and attorneys fees. 
LaFleur refused the punitive reassignment position she was offered in the most 
violent Cleveland school and instead worked as a teacher in suburban Lake-
wood until she began law school in 1974, first at Cleveland State and then in 
Utah. She became a public defender, clinical law professor, private attorney, 
and mediator. Reflecting on the case, LaFleur (now Nessett-Sale) said, “I’m not 
quite sure why I started my case. . . . There must have been a lot of other women 
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who were affected by this rule. . . . The fundamental unfairness of it seemed 
morally wrong, not just stupid but wrong; and that men were making the deci-
sions didn’t help, because they didn’t know what it was to be pregnant. It wasn’t 
fair, and it made me angry.”38
 She recalled how her young son, Michael, attended the Sixth Circuit argu-
ment in LaFleur, at her lawyer’s suggestion. She and Michael rode up the eleva-
tor with an elderly man who remarked, “He’s a cute little guy,” and she replied, 
“He’s a sweetheart.” When she later saw that man, retired Supreme Court Jus-
tice Tom Clark, sitting on her panel, she was just glad the toddler had not been 
having a tantrum on the way to the courtroom. In a remembrance of the case, 
LaFleur poignantly acknowledged her children—her college-age daughter, who 
helped edit the article, and her son, “the baby at the center of the lawsuit, who 
died in his youth.”39
Abortion as a Woman’s Right
The LaFleur case reached the Supreme Court at the crest of the feminist wave, 
in October 1973. Congress adopted the ERA in 1972, and more than half the 
state legislatures ratified the amendment over the next few months. Congress 
also passed the Equal Pay Act in 1973. And in January 1973, the Supreme Court 
decided Roe v. Wade, recognizing a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
 Abortion had become a women’s rights issue beginning in the late 1960s. 
The procedure was criminalized in the late nineteenth century, altering the 
common-law practice that had permitted abortion up until the time of quicken-
ing at four months. Efforts to reform the criminal laws began in the 1950s and 
1960s, led by public health officials concerned about the injuries and deaths 
resulting from illegal abortions. They sought reforms such as those suggested by 
an American Law Institute proposal, first made in 1957, that gave doctors greater 
authority to decide when “therapeutic abortions” were justifiable for the physical 
or mental health of the mother. Feminists then began to connect their concern 
with the ability of women to participate fully in the economy with the ability of 
women to remove the burdens of childbearing by controlling their reproduc-
tive lives. An influential speech by Betty Friedan in February 1969 expanded 
this feminist argument by declaring that abortion was the right of women to 
control their own bodies, their own lives, and their own place in society. Four 
states—Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington—legalized abortion in 1970, 
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and courts in seven other states declared their criminal abortion statutes uncon-
stitutional. In 1973, Roe then recognized a woman’s fundamental privacy right 
to choose an abortion in consultation with her doctor. Immediately after Roe, 
legislatures continued to pass abortion restrictions, fueled by the growing right 
to life movement that expanded nationally in 1973 beyond its original sponsor-
ship by the Catholic Church. But “the decision in Roe v. Wade neither started 
nor ended the debate over abortion.”40
 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron involved a challenge 
to one of these post-Roe regulations. The case came at the beginning of the 
public debate on abortion, an issue that had previously been relegated to private 
discussion and underground practice. After the Supreme Court legalized abor-
tion in Roe, the issue became publicly visible in the Akron, Ohio, area when 
three abortion clinics began operating. Women traveled to Akron from all parts 
of Ohio and neighboring states for legal and affordable abortions. In August 
1976, two leaders in the Greater Akron Right to Life organization, Jane Hubbard 
and Ann Marie Segedy, proposed that the city regulate abortion. The Akron City 
Council did not pass the proposed ordinance on the advice of the city’s legal 
department, which concluded the law was unconstitutional, but instead passed 
a narrower law requiring only that abortions after the first three months of preg-
nancy had to be performed in hospitals.41
 A second and more comprehensive abortion regulation was then proposed 
in October 1977, shortly before council elections. The regulation was drafted by 
Alan Segedy, a lawyer for the right to life group, in consultation with two law 
professors at the University of Notre Dame and the University of Texas.42 The 
regulation was designed to be a model for national restrictions on abortion, and 
it was quickly adopted by twenty states. Similar municipal regulations had been 
passed (and declared unconstitutional) in Chicago and St. Louis.43 The Akron 
regulation had seventeen provisions requiring, among other things: (1) the per-
formance of second-trimester abortions in hospitals; (2) parental consent for 
minors under fifteen; (3) parental notification for minors between fifteen and 
eighteen; (4) informed consent for all women, pursuant to highly detailed dis-
closures by the physician on the risks and procedures of abortion, the possible 
dire physical and emotional consequences of abortion, and the fact that “the 
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception”; (5) a twenty-
four-hour waiting period following this counseling; and (6) the “humane dis-
posal of the fetus.”44 Akron’s chief trial attorney, Willard F. Spicer, advised the 
council that the law was unconstitutional, saying, “There’s no question in my 
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mind if the ordinance was passed it would be knocked out very quickly.” He also 
detailed in a memo the city’s exposure to significant attorneys fees and damages 
if it lost the case.45 Just a year earlier, a three-judge panel on the Northern Dis-
trict had struck down a similar Ohio statute requiring parental consent.46
 The proposed Akron ordinance triggered a series of heated public meetings 
before the City Council Health and Social Services Committee during the 
snowy winter of 1978, when Akron was hit by a blizzard dubbed the “storm of 
the century.”47 Each hearing was packed with 200 to 300 people. NOW led the 
organized opposition to the ordinance. The supporters were led by a national 
right to life leader from Cincinnati, Dr. J. C. Willke. With his wife, Willke had 
self-published a book in 1971 called the Handbook of Abortion, which soon 
became a bible for the right to life movement.48 The county health director, 
Dr. William Keck, testified against the bill, arguing that professional ethics and 
existing regulations were sufficient assurances of quality health care.49 Religious 
leaders came out strongly for the ordinance: the Catholic bishop lobbied par-
ishes; a Catholic nun and principal contacted parents from her school; and an 
Orthodox Jew, Marvin Weinberger, was the driving force of the local movement. 
Both the national Catholic Church and the Orthodox Jewish leadership had 
spoken out against abortion and called for active repeal of state laws that liberal-
ized grounds for the procedure. Weinberger, a law student who was described 
as “overzealous,” talked about “little stunts” he used to manipulate the media 
and attract publicity. These included an all-night prayer vigil in frigid weather 
on the eve of the council vote, which was attended by 600 antiabortion protes-
tors and was held at the Lutheran church across the street from council cham-
bers. The vigil made the national nightly news on all three existing television 
channels. On the day of the vote, 150 people overflowed council chambers and 
the hallway to hear the final forty-five-minute debate. Thirty protestors paraded 
outside of chambers, wrapped in blankets against the cold.50 In hindsight, it 
seems the feminist movement was surprised by and unprepared for the determi-
nation of the abortion opposition, perhaps naively assuming that Roe had set-
tled the question of the availability of abortion.
 The Akron abortion resolution passed by a vote of 7 to 6. The lone Repub-
lican on the council of thirteen, John Frank, voted against the regulation. Frank 
later said his own personal experience involving an unplanned pregnancy of his 
former girlfriend persuaded him that abortion was none of the council’s business. 
He declared, “It’s a woman decision whether or not to have a baby. Period.”51 The 
two women on the council split their vote. Kathleen Greissing, a nurse, voted for 
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it as an assurance of “good quality healthcare for women.” Elsie Reaven, who 
was ousted as chair of the Health and Social Services Committee in a move to 
shepherd the ordinance through, was outraged that the “dominant male faction 
in council had the arrogance to persist against all reason in burdening and pos-
sibly encumbering women.” The ordinance became law when the mayor nei-
ther signed nor vetoed the bill.52
 The ACLU brought suit on behalf of three abortion clinics and one doctor. 
No pregnant woman would agree to be a plaintiff because the trial judge, Leroy 
Contie, refused to allow the women (or the doctors) to proceed anonymously 
under pseudonyms, as was commonly done in abortion cases.53 A putative plain-
tiff detailed her fear regarding the publicity entailed in participating in the case 
and the potential embarrassment, harassment, and personal attacks. The brief 
in support of the motion explained that “many citizens of Akron, Ohio, have 
had strong emotional reaction to the debate over the propriety of abortion,” and 
it detailed the “manifestations of social strife” that had occurred including regu-
lar public demonstrations, threatening and harassing telephone calls and letters, 
and one act of arson. Even plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Stephan Landsman, a profes-
sor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, initially turned down the case because 
he did not want abortion demonstrations in front of his house. His wife’s in-
credulous reaction to his fears—“Are you kidding me?”—convinced him to 
take the case.
 The case proceeded as a question of women’s health. At trial, plaintiffs ar-
gued that the Akron abortion ordinance was a “straightjacket for doctors.” Defen-
dants argued that women’s health concerns necessitated regulation. The case 
became a battle of the experts. Plaintiffs presented prestigious medical experts 
supported by the national ACLU, including one who had received a Nobel 
Prize in the Philosophy of Medicine. The right to life intervenors, who led the 
defense’s case, proffered less impressive witnesses who were easily discredited 
on cross-examination. This litigation of abortion as a medical issue, however, 
rendered the women involved invisible. As Bonnie Bolitho, a witness and coun-
selor at one of the abortion clinics, later said, “It was pretty clear to me that the 
vast majority of men involved in this were not interested in the lives of individ-
ual women.”54
 Justice Blackmun’s medical analysis in Roe, derived from his experience as 
an attorney for the Mayo Clinic, seemed to call for this type of health care ap-
proach. Roe had framed abortion as an issue of doctors’ paternalistic care and 
medical science, even while offering a seemingly objective ground for legalizing 
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abortion. The emphasis on the medical nature of abortion affected the strategy 
of legislatures and litigants, including the parties in the Akron case. It was only 
on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Akron plaintiffs secondarily articu-
lated the issue as the denial of women’s autonomy and a portrayal of women as 
irrational and incapable decision makers. But “casting abortion as a medical 
decision shifts the focus away from women. . . . Protecting physicians’ rights 
provided little or no foundation for according women rights. Indeed, it under-
mined women and their rights by denying them the respect necessary to sup-
port their right of choice.”55
 Judge Contie was a conservative, Catholic Italian American who by most 
accounts was considered a “great judge,” respected for his hard work and known 
as a “pretty tough character.”56 A Nixon appointee, he was the first Northern 
District judge to sit in Akron (nominated to fill James Connell’s seat just after 
the LaFleur case), and he was later appointed by President Ronald Reagan to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Contie had served as law direc-
tor for the city of Canton and was well known for his aggressive attack on local 
Mafia crime and police corruption, which led to the bombing of his home.
 Judge Contie made a particular effort in the case to distance himself from 
the national political controversy over abortion: “Analytically, . . . this case is no 
different than the numerous others that come before this Court. It is the duty of 
this Court to determine the controversy before it based upon the requirements 
of the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. In considering the present case, this Court has at-
tempted to do just that, nothing more and nothing less.” He added a footnote, 
quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter: “As a member of this Court, I am not justified 
in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how 
deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard. . . . It 
can never be emphasized too much that one’s own opinion about the wisdom 
or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one’s duty on 
the bench.”57
 Judge Contie issued a compromise decision almost one year after the trial, 
and both sides claimed they had won. Antiabortion leaders called the ruling 
“terrific” and “a major victory for pro-life people,” but the head of the Ohio 
ACLU retorted, “Another such victory and they [the right to life leaders] will 
be permanently undone.”58 The decision invalidated parental consent, parental 
notification, detailed informed consent, disposal restrictions, and clinic inspec-
tion. It upheld the twenty-four-hour waiting period, the doctor’s explanation of 
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risks and procedures, and reporting requirements. Contie’s approach was care-
ful and measured but frustrating to the plaintiffs, who wanted him to consider 
the underlying issues of council’s improper use of religious motives in legislat-
ing abortion. The court seemed to be searching for a practical way to split the 
proverbial baby, constrained to follow the commands of Roe yet resistant to em-
bracing the evolving precepts of gender equity reflected in the abortion issue.59
 The Sixth Circuit, in a 2-to-1 decision, invalidated all of the provisions ex-
cept for two: parental notification and the hospital requirement for second-term 
abortions. The appellate court criticized Judge Contie for employing a less de-
manding judicial review than that required by Roe for first-trimester restrictions. 
Contie had used a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny by asking whether 
the regulation was unduly burdensome and whether the government had a 
valid state interest.60
 The U.S. Supreme Court forcefully struck down the Akron law, reaffirming 
its abortion rights jurisprudence ten years after Roe.61 Justice Lewis Powell, writ-
ing for the majority in a 6-to-3 decision, found some of the provisions to be 
motivated by impermissible objectives: “It is fair to say that much of the infor-
mation required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to 
persuade her to withhold it altogether.” The Court applied heightened scrutiny 
to invalidate the five provisions it considered, and it rejected a lower standard of 
inquiry that “would uphold virtually any abortion regulation under a rational-
basis test.” The solicitor general for the Reagan administration, Rex Lee, argued 
for the abandonment of the Roe strict scrutiny review in favor of the lesser “un-
due burden” standard. Justice Blackmun, author of Roe, asked him point-blank, 
“Mr. Solicitor General, are you asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled?” Lee re-
sponded no, saying that he was simply arguing for a standard that accommo-
dated a deference to the legislature.62
 Akron’s law director, Robert Pritt, also saw the case as one involving legisla-
tive power and the principle of local home rule. He had initially defended the 
ordinance on legal, rather than moral, grounds, but he became troubled by abor-
tion by the end of the case. Pritt was concerned about the “tremendous amount 
of money” allegedly being made by the clinics, as was Councilman Ray Kapper, 
who said, “I talked to a lot of people over those years and a lot of them don’t 
know what kind of money those rip-off artists were making off teen-agers.”63
 The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Akron was seen as an enormous 
symbolic victory for women’s rights, with the practical effect of invalidating the 
abortion regulations of more than twenty-one states. Judge David Dowd, Contie’s 
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successor on the bench, awarded the plaintiffs attorneys fees of $368,710.64 Coun-
cilman John Frank demanded that Willke and the national right to life organi-
zation pay the city’s expenses, but they refused, politely thanking the city for its 
valiant antiabortion efforts.65 The share of fees paid to Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law was used for the Harry Blackmun Scholarship Fund, named for the 
author of the Roe decision. Justice Blackmun himself attended the dedication, 
lured to Cleveland by the promise of a much-beloved baseball game with Cleve-
land Hall of Fame pitcher Bob Feller.66
 The invalidation of the abortion regulation in City of Akron, however, re-
mained good law for only a short time. Less than a decade later, in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reversed course and upheld provisions 
requiring informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and parental con-
sent.67 Today, Ohio, like many states, has reenacted the types of abortion restric-
tions that were previously struck down.68 The decision in City of Akron is now 
usually cited, if it is cited at all, for the dissent by the newly appointed Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, which showed the first inkling that the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence was in doubt.
A Shifting Perspective
Just three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Akron, the Northern 
District once again considered the legality of parental notification. In Akron 
Reproductive Center v. Rosen, the court considered a 1985 Ohio law that required 
a minor under the age of eighteen to notify one parent about a planned abor-
tion.69 Unlike the parent notification provision struck down in City of Akron, this 
law included a judicial bypass exception.
 Judge Ann Aldrich was assigned the case and granted both the preliminary 
and the permanent injunctions invalidating the parental notification law. Con-
sidering the facial validity of the law, Aldrich found numerous constitutional 
defects with the bypass provision, including a lack of anonymity, no expedited 
process, confusing pleading forms, the clear and convincing standard, and the 
physician’s duty to notify. Aldrich found that the law had potential for “violations 
of the constitutional rights of mature minors and minors for whom notification 
would not be in their best interests.”70 The sponsor of the bill, Representative 
Jerome Luebbers of Cincinnati, said, “I fully expected that the judge would do 
this. She’s predictable.”71
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 Judge Aldrich was predictable because she had distinguished herself as one 
of the most liberal members of the court, with a strong commitment to social 
justice. A framed needlepoint slogan hanging on the wall of her chambers read: 
“Women who seek to be equal with men lack ambition.” Standing over six feet 
tall, Aldrich was a tough woman who had been on her own from the age of 
eight, when her mother died in a Rhode Island hurricane. She rebuilt railroad 
lines in Yugoslavia after World War II, raced Siberian huskies, and married a 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent as her first husband. She was the only 
woman in her class at New York University Law School, and she recounted how 
she was hated by most of her classmates, who thought she was taking space from 
a worthy veteran and was there just to get a husband. As an attorney and law 
professor, she focused her efforts on racial justice. She represented the United 
Church of Christ and sued the Federal Communications Commission to make it 
easier for minorities to own radio stations in the South. Aldrich arrived in Cleve-
land in 1968 as the first full-time female law professor at Cleveland-Marshall, 
where she was later joined by WLF founders Jane Picker and Lizabeth Moody. 
Women still constituted less than 1 percent of law professors nationwide at the 
time, even though the first woman had been appointed to a tenure-track posi-
tion at Berkeley in 1919.72 Aldrich was instrumental in founding the law school’s 
diversity student recruitment program. She drove to Tupelo, Mississippi, seek-
ing to find qualified future law students at the historically all-black teachers’ 
colleges of the South. The students, among them the future Ohio appellate judge 
Patricia Blackmon, often came with nothing, and Professor Aldrich supported 
them, even inviting them to live in her home.73
 Aldrich was the first woman judge in the Northern District, appointed in 
1980 by President Jimmy Carter. She followed the legacy of Florence Allen, 
the first female judge elected to the state court in Ohio in 1921 and appointed 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1934. Carter made a de-
termined effort to increase the number of women and black federal judges; he 
would appoint forty-one women to the bench during his tenure. Yet like most 
federal and state courts, the Northern District would remain less than 20 per-
cent female for the next twenty-five years.74 When a new judicial position was 
created in the Northern District, the women’s rights advocates went into high 
gear. Advocates such as Lana Moresky from NOW worked to vet female can-
didates. Most of those candidates were law professors, including three from 
Cleveland State, as there was a lack of senior women in corporations or law 
firms at that time. 
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 Once appointed to the bench, Judge Aldrich encountered turmoil and col-
legial difficulties on the court when she accused the chief judge of influence 
peddling and when she herself was accused of lying for romantic gain. The 
scandal that ensued temporarily diminished the dignity of Cleveland’s federal 
bench, leading one judge to say, “I wish this were all a bad dream and we could 
wake up and say it’s over.”75
 With one woman on the court, the potential existed for litigants in gender 
cases to find a more receptive judicial audience. As empirical work has shown, 
there are significant differences in voting patterns among judges in sex discrimi-
nation cases, with male judges much less likely to decide in favor of the plain-
tiff.76 One lawyer representing a defendant in an employment sex discrimination 
case before Judge Aldrich seemed concerned about this inclination and asked 
the judge to recuse herself. She refused. In Akron II, Aldrich showed an appre-
ciation of the practical difficulties facing young women seeking abortions, even 
though she did not accept the plaintiffs’ arguments completely. She found that 
the evidentiary standard in the bypass procedure created “an unacceptably high 
risk of erroneous determinations,” since “the judge’s decision will necessarily 
be based largely upon subjective standards without the benefit of any evidence 
other than a woman’s testimony.”77 As Aldrich had suspected, many of these 
judicial bypass decisions turned out “to be at the whim of the judge.” One judge 
denied a judicial exemption to a seventeen-year-old despite evidence of physical 
abuse by her father, another judge denied a bypass because a seventeen-year-
old girl had not had enough “hard knocks,” and a third judge denied the excep-
tion because the teenager refused to file a paternity suit against her partner.78
 The law took effect after the Supreme Court overruled Judge Aldrich’s deci-
sion in Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Center (Akron II). Though the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had affirmed the unconstitutionality of the statute, the Supreme 
Court found the judicial bypass procedure valid.79 Justice Blackmun vigorously 
dissented, finding Ohio’s bypass procedure to be a “tortuous maze” that delib-
erately placed a pattern of obstacles in the path of pregnant minors. He found 
the challenged provisions to be merely “poorly disguised elements of discour-
agement for the abortion decision.”80 Counsel for the plaintiffs, Linda Sogg, 
had tried to make these points at oral argument, explaining how the law “stacks 
the decks” against the minor. But Sogg was encumbered by a shrill voice and a 
lack of appreciation for the tenuousness of the abortion right among the jus-
tices. They were more persuaded by the legalistic arguments of Rita Eppler 
from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, who argued that the law balanced the 
rights of minor women against the rights and interests of their parents.81
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 In upholding the parental notification law, Justice Anthony Kennedy and 
two other justices applied a low level of judicial scrutiny, concluding that the 
regulation did not impose an undue burden and that it was a rational way to 
further the end of protecting the health of young women. This standard, sug-
gested by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in City of Akron, was subsequently adopted 
by the controlling plurality of the Court two years after Akron II in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.82 The Casey decision identified an important government 
interest in protecting a minor’s mental health from the psychological risk that 
she might later regret her abortion. This mental health rationale was later ex-
tended to all women by the Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which 
upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act banning a rarely used late-term 
abortion procedure. The Carhart Court held it was important to protect adult 
women from the alleged mental and emotional consequences of the decision to 
have an abortion. Scientific studies conducted after the decision, however, con-
cluded that the evidence did not support the claim that abortion caused mental 
health problems in women.83 A scathing dissent by Justice Ginsburg in Carhart 
emphasized that the rationale of protecting women “reflects ancient notions 
about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that have 
long since been discredited.”84 These abortion decisions reinforced stereotypes 
about women’s primary role as mothers and the assumed irrationality of their 
decision making—normative concerns of gender that reached beyond the issue 
of abortion.85
The Northern District of Ohio was drawn into the national debate over wom-
en’s rights through a series of key cases that ultimately were resolved by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. These cases served as vehicles for meaningful social change 
for women, even while they also served to reinforce conventional gender norms. 
The cases were fueled by dedicated women advocates, parties, and judges who 
understood the need for social change to promote gender equality. Although 
the courts often operated out of a sense of the rule of law, they did address the 
claims of sex equality that came before them, ultimately acknowledging wom-
en’s rights as they developed.
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